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INTRODUCTION 
Mental states matter. Consequently, we and colleagues designed and 
executed a brain-imaging experiment attempting to detect—for the ,rst 
time—di*erences between mental states relevant to criminal law. 
Imagine you’ve just killed someone in Colorado. It was not your purpose 
or desire to kill him. Nevertheless, another human being is dead. Arrested 
and on trial, you do not dispute that your action unjusti,ably caused his 
death. But whereas the prosecutor argues that you knew someone would die 
as an inevitable by-product of your actions, you assert in your defense that 
you knew no such thing. Instead (you claim) you were merely reckless. That 
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is, you acted as you did with awareness of a substantial risk that someone 
would be fatally injured, but without knowing you would kill anyone. 
In Colorado, as in many states, there is a huge di*erence in the sentencing 
ranges for those convicted of knowing and reckless homicides. In Colorado it 
means the di*erence between being sentenced to sixteen to forty-eight years 
in prison and none.1 So your fate rests in the hands of lay jurors who will 
decide what your mental state was at the time of the fatal act. Speci,cally: 
Did you know you would kill someone, or were you merely aware of a risk that 
you would? 
Now, any plausible theory of the point or purpose of meting out punishment 
to offenders—whether utilitarian, retributivist or expressivist—will recognize 
good reasons to condition punishment, or its amount, on the offender’s mental 
state. Mental states matter to the nature and severity of incentives to which 
human behavior is sensitive, to moral desert, and to society’s collective outrage. 
But, whatever its rationale, the practice of predicating differences in punishment 
on differences in mental state means that you now face two large problems 
ignored by our current criminal justice system. 
First, the criminal justice system simply assumes that most jurors can 
reliably distinguish between the two mental states at issue. It is well known 
to all ,rst-year law students that the supermajority of states follows the 
Model Penal Code’s long-standing approach to categorizing culpable mental 
states into four types: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. Large 
numbers of o*enses, including homicides, are then subdivided into 
corresponding categories. And the extent of legal intervention—length of 
prison stay, for instance—scales accordingly. But less well known is that a 
body of experimental evidence suggests that jurors are not particularly good 
at understanding which category is which.2 Subjects frequently get it wrong, 
 
1 Second degree murder, without any heat of passion mitigator, is de#ned and classi#ed as a 
Class $ felony at COLO. REV. STAT. § !%-&-!'&(!)-(&)(a) ($'!'). Class $ felonies ordinarily carry a 
non-mandatory presumptive sentence of eight to twenty-four years. Id. § !%-!.&-('!(!)(a)(V)(A). 
However, murder is often considered to be a crime of violence, a determination that has the e"ects 
of (!) increasing the range to sixteen to forty-eight years; and ($) making a prison sentence 
mandatory. Id. § !%-!.&-(') (pertaining to murders involving deadly weapons or to crimes causing 
serious bodily harm or death). By contrast, a reckless murder is classi#ed as manslaughter, and 
carries a non-mandatory sentence of two to six years. Id. § !%-&-!'((!). Manslaughter is de#ned and 
classi#ed as a Class ( felony in Colorado. Id. § !%-&-!'(($). Class ( felonies carry a non-
mandatory presumptive sentence of between two and six years. Id. § !%-!.&-('!(!)(a)(V)(A.!). 
Manslaughter is not de#ned as a crime of violence in Colorado. Id. § !%-!.&-('). 
2 See, e.g., Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene & René Marois, 
Sorting Guilty Minds, %) N.Y.U. L. REV. !&') ($'!!); Matthew R. Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J. 
Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, René Marois & Kenneth W. Simons, The Language of Mens 
Rea, )* VAND. L. REV. !&$* ($'!() [hereinafter Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea]; Matthew R. 
Ginther, Fancis X. Shen, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones & Kenneth W. Simons, 
Decoding Guilty Minds: How Jurors Attribute Knowledge and Guilt, *! VAND. L. REV. $(! ($'!%) [hereinafter 
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even when directly instructed on the relevant legal de,nitions and standards. 
They ,nd it particularly di-cult to sort defendants between the Model Penal 
Code’s categories of “knowing” and “reckless.” They confuse the two about 
(+% of the time, under some conditions, and do little better under others.3 In 
such a case, that’s nearly coin-.ipping odds of false conviction. 
The other big problem is that no one knows if the legally assumed and 
statutorily instantiated distinction between knowing and reckless mental 
states reflects an actual and inherent psychological difference. Sure, we 
might all believe such a difference exists, on the basis of introspection 
alone. But introspection seems an insufficiently sound basis on which to 
lay the very foundations for policy distinctions of such large consequence. 
The supposed distinction between knowing and reckless could be nothing 
more than a convenient fiction, upon which countless trials—and far more 
plea bargains—have been built. 
To see the bite of this second problem, ,rst consider the way in which 
Legal Realists have approached the mens rea categories. The Legal Realist 
tradition is well-known for the claim that many legal terms and concepts 
falsely purport to classify defendants and their circumstances on the basis of 
their intrinsic features.4 Instead, assert the Realists, defendants are classi,ed 
on the basis only of the judge’s desire to hold some liable and to decline to 
hold others liable, even when those two groups of people do not di*er in any 
way other than in the eye of the judge.5 But then note that this critique has 
 
Ginther et al., Decoding Guilty Minds]; see also, Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, ++ 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY &!* ($''+); James A. Macleod, Belief States in Criminal Law, )% OKLA. L. 
REV. (+* ($'!)); Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological 
Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, (+ HOW. L.J. ! ($'',). 
3 Shen et al., supra note $, at !&,!. Note that subjects are typically less able to correctly identify 
knowing and reckless scenarios than to correctly identify the other mental states, even when given 
de#nitions of the mental states. Id. at !&(%. Even when the ability to classify correctly is improved 
under experimental conditions, using variations on de#nition language, knowing and reckless mental 
states remain by far the hardest to classify. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, supra note $, at 
!&,$. Indeed, under such circumstances, even in the best case only ,+% of subjects accurately identify 
reckless scenarios as reckless. And *'% of those misidenti#cations confuse a reckless scenario for a 
knowing one. Id. at !&,+.   
4 The Realists were especially known for o"ering this critique of legal concepts like “causation” 
and “corporation.” Whether the defendant “proximately caused” the plainti" ’s harm, Legal Realists 
argue, turns not on the presence or absence of any liability-independent features of the case—such 
as the “reasonable foreseeability” of the harm or the absence of “voluntary intervention.” Rather, 
judges claim to be deciding cases on the basis of such features when what really decides the question 
is something else, something about the judge or his or her views about what makes for sound policy. 
See, for example, Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, &, COLUM. 
L. REV. %'+ (!+&,) and KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (!+&'). 
5 Dan Kahan’s two notable papers on mistakes in criminal law are naturally construed as 
o"ering just this kind of critique of mens rea concepts. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law is 
an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, +) MICH. L. REV. !$* (!++*); Dan M. Kahan, Reply, Is Ignorance 
of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?, +) MICH. L. REV. $!$& (!++%). According to Kahan, the law 
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extended to juries as well. That is, the Legal Realists claim that the question 
of whether you were knowing or reckless when you performed the act that 
killed someone only purports to be a question about your psychology. 
The important, long-lingering question—as relevant to retributivists as to 
utilitarians—is therefore this. Does the distinction between Model Penal Code 
mens rea categories, such as knowing and reckless, reflect an intrinsic 
psychological difference, actually found in human beings? If so, we believe that 
one should expect in principle that there would also be a difference between the 
brains of reckless and knowing individuals, at the times of their actions. Because, 
after all (and setting aside some philosophical subtleties6) anytime there is a 
psychological difference there must also be a brain difference. 
So is there a neural di"erence or not? Regardless of where legislators choose 
to draw the lines between di*erent mental states, and regardless of how many 
categories they create, those categories should re.ect something real, and not 
merely assumed or hoped-for. Because the lives and liberties for thousands, 
each year, depend on the mental state category assigned to them. 
So if we have used the supposed distinction between knowing and reckless 
(and other Model Penal Code categories) to justify a di*erent treatment 
under the law, when there is in fact no detectable or meaningful psychological 
distinction, then widespread injustice will have followed in the wake of the 
Model Penal Code, and will continue inde,nitely, if unchecked. 
With a grant of nearly /#++,+++ from the MacArthur Foundation Research 
Network on Law and Neuroscience7 (Research Network), we—as part of a larger 
 
allows people with no relevant intrinsic psychological di"erences to be distinctly classi#ed as having 
made, or having failed to make, an exculpatory mistake. See Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal 
Attempts—The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, (' YALE L.J. ,&, )%-)+ (!+&') (arguing the di"erent 
concepts of “intent” are post fact ways of rationalizing verdicts reached for independent reasons); 
Janice Nadler, Blaming as a Social Process: The In#uence of Character and Moral Emotion on Blame, *, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. !, ( ($'!$) (“[M]oral character might serve as a kind of proxy for mental 
state, so that a person with a bad character is blamed as if he were reckless, whereas a person with a 
good character is blamed as if he were not reckless.”). 
6 The philosophical literature concerned with the view labeled “externalism about mental 
content” concerns the possibility that mental states could vary even without variation in brain 
activity, and without postulating the existence of some non-material aspect to mind. The classic 
statement of the view is found in $ HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’ in MIND, 
LANGUAGE, AND REALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS $!, (!+*,). For a useful overview, see Joe Lau 
& Max Deutsch, Externalism About Mental Content, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/content-externalism/ [https://perma.cc/Z$C$-$GEF]. 
7 One of us (Jones) designed and directs the Research Network, which is headquartered at 
Vanderbilt University and funded by over -*,,'',''' in grants from the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation. The Research Network partners selected leading legal scholars, 
neuroscientists, and judges from around the country for intensive collaborative work on law-relevant 
neuroscience experiments. For further information on the Research Network, its activities, and its 
many publications, see THE MACARTHUR FOUND. RSCH. NETWORK ON L. & NEUROSCIENCE, 
www.lawneuro.org [https://perma.cc/J*TP-FLPZ] (last visited Sept. !!, $'$'). 
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interdisciplinary team8—set out to investigate the knowing-reckless distinction 
in the brain, and the boundary that may separate them. Specifically, we aimed 
to see if we could use brain activity alone to detect the difference between those 
who the law would classify as “knowing” and as “reckless.” By combining the 
relatively new technical achievements of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) with new advances in the analytic abilities of machine-learning 
algorithms (a form of artificial intelligence) our team conducted the first assault 
on this thorny legal problem. 
This Essay reports and describes, for a legal audience, the results and 
implications of our experiment. We found evidence strongly supporting the 
existence of a brain-based distinction between knowing and reckless mental 
states. Our detailed neuroscience paper was ,rst published in a dedicated 
peer-reviewed science journal, the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences.9 It received some sensationalist press coverage, including headlines 
such as this one from the British Daily Mail: Something On Your Mind? AI Can 
Read Your Thoughts and Tell Whether You are Guilty of Committing a Crime.10 
Half-truths like these are dangerous. So our goal here is to explain for a legal, 
non-scienti,c audience what we did and—more importantly—how it does 
and does not matter for the law. 
Our team’s discovery is relevant to law in two ways.11 First, it provides 
new information relevant to the substantive debates over the accuracy and 
legitimacy of the distinction the Model Penal Code draws between knowing 
and reckless mental states. In this one important domain, that is, there is 
reason to think that what the law purports to do—draw a distinction in 
liability on the basis of a distinction in psychological state—is what it actually 
does. Second and collaterally, our results serve as a concrete and salient 
example of how new neuroscienti,c techniques, sometimes partnered with 
arti,cial intelligence tools, can be used to probe matters of legal relevance. 
 
8 One of us (Ya"e) led the Working Group on Detection and Classi#cation in collaboration 
with neuroscientist Read Montague. The full interdisciplinary team, in alphabetical order, consisted 
of: Woo-Young Ahn, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B. Ho"man, Owen Jones, Terry Lohrenz, Read 
Montague, Stephen Morse, Iris Vilares, Michael Wesley, Gideon Ya"e. 
9 See Iris Vilares, Michael J. Wesley, Woo-Young Ahn, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris Ho"man, 
Owen D. Jones, Stephen J. Morse, Gideon Ya"e, Terry Lohrenz & P. Read Montague, Predicting the 
Knowledge-Recklessness Distinction in the Human Brain, !!( PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. &$$$ ($'!*) 
[hereinafter Predicting]. 
10 Tim Collins, DAILY MAIL (Mar. !&, $'!*, &:'& PM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
sciencetech/article-(&'!*+)/Mind-reading-AI-knows-guilty-innocent.html [https://perma.cc/QG(% 
-EW,Q]. 
11 For overviews of ways neuroscience can be relevant to law, see Owen D. Jones, Seven Ways 
Neuroscience Aids Law, in NEUROSCIENCES AND THE HUMAN PERSON !%! (Antonio M. Battro, 
Stanislas Dehaene, Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo & Wolf J. Singer, eds., $'!&); Owen D. Jones & Anthony 
D. Wagner, Law and Neuroscience: Progress, Promise, and Pitfalls, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 
!'!, (David Poeppel, George R. Mangun & Michael S. Gazzaniga eds., )th ed., $'$'). 
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We proceed in three primary parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
experiment and the results. Along the way, it offers a necessary but brief and 
accessible introduction to how fMRI brain imaging works. Part II discusses the 
important implications of this new finding. Part III provides necessary caveats 
and cautions, to ensure that our results won’t be over- or misinterpreted. 
I. DETECTING MENS REA IN THE BRAIN 
A. Background: Initial Obstacles 
The central challenge was to develop an experimental paradigm that could 
elicit states of mind that legal scholars and the legal system in general would 
consistently classify as knowing and reckless. So suppose two di*erent 
scenarios in which a person takes something that does not belong to him 
without permission. In both scenarios, our defendant emails his neighbor to 
ask permission to borrow that neighbor’s car. Assume further that, in the past, 
the neighbor has said yes to this request about half the time, and about half 
the time has said no. 
In the first scenario, our defendant checks his email and sees that the 
neighbor has said no. Then the defendant borrows the neighbor’s car anyway, 
knowing full well that he does not have permission to do so. He figures 
(incorrectly as it turns out) that the neighbor won’t even notice. In the second 
scenario, our defendant never checks his email for a reply, and therefore never 
sees that the neighbor has said no. Then the defendant goes ahead and borrows 
the car anyway. He figures there’s about a (+% chance he has permission, and he 
also figures (incorrectly) that either way the neighbor will probably never notice. 
The Model Penal Code would classify the first defendant as liable for a knowing 
theft and the second as liable for a reckless theft. 
As the example makes plain, a central component of the distinction 
between knowing and reckless mental states, under the Model Penal Code 
regime, is that a person in a knowing state of mind is essentially "++% certain 
about the presence of an element of a crime. In contrast, a person in a reckless 
state of mind can have a belief about the probability located within a range—
not so low as to promise a de minimis expected harm, but not so high as to be 
functionally equivalent to certainty. So what we needed was an experiment in 
which subjects would sometimes choose to perform an act while knowing a 
certain condition was in place, and sometimes choose to perform the same act 
while aware, instead, of a risk high enough to potentially qualify as 
“substantial and unjusti,able” while still far enough below "++% as to fall 
short of knowledge. 
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B. The Paradigm: Eliciting Knowing and Reckless Mental States 
We asked our subjects to imagine that they were given an opportunity to 
carry a briefcase across the border.12 The briefcase might or might not contain 
“valuable content” (such as documents or microchip processors), which we 
refer to as “contraband.”13 And a carried briefcase might or might not be 
searched at the border. 
There was a signi,cant ,nancial incentive to choose to carry the briefcase. 
Speci,cally, subjects who could get a briefcase across the border without 
being searched could leave the lab with quite a lot of money (sixty dollars, on 
top of the twenty dollars they earned for participating). But getting caught 
at the border carrying the contraband resulted in a ,nancial penalty (the 
subject could leave with nothing more than the fee for participating). The 
other two options—getting “caught” with an empty briefcase or crossing 
successfully with an empty briefcase—had payo*s in between. 
What we were primarily interested in was the di*erences between our 
subjects’ brain activity when they were certain that the briefcase contained 
contraband and their brain activity when there was some “substantial and 
unjusti,able” risk that it did. While subjects made decisions about whether 
to carry briefcases across the border, we scanned their brains. 
We instructed subjects before the game began on the details of the payo* 
structure, as illustrated in Figure ". Subjects began each of the "!( trials they 
completed with a hypothetical /#,+++ in the bank. The payo* structure then 
governed how much a subject could earn or lose from the intersection of her 
choice (carry or don’t carry) with two variables (") the probability that a 
carried case contained contraband (the Contraband Risk); and (!) the 












12 The subjects for this experiment were (' in number, half of them female, half of them male. 
Their average age was about $+. 
13 We used the phrase “valuable content” with subjects instead of, say, “illegal drugs” to reduce the 
possibility that some subjects would always refuse the option to carry a case, on moral or legal grounds. 
(None did.) For brevity, however, in this Essay, we refer to the valuable content as “contraband.” 
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Figure !: Payo" Structure 
 


















Speci,cally, a subject gained /!,+++ (in her virtual bank account) each 
time she carried a case containing contraband through a checkpoint 
unapprehended. But she lost /),+++ from that account if she carried a case 
with contraband and got caught. If she carried a case that ultimately 
contained no contraband, she lost /(++, regardless of whether her case was 
searched. To incentivize the subjects to make a choice, especially the choice 
to carry, we added two more fees: choosing not to carry cost /",(++ and 
refusing to choose whether or not to carry cost /!,(++. We also informed 
subjects that if they completed the experiment they would receive "% of the 
payout from one trial, chosen at random. Subjects could take this "% home in 
cash. Given the details of the payo* structure, each subject therefore received 
between twenty and eighty dollars for participating. These payo* details are 
illustrated in Figure ". 
At the beginning of a trial, we provided each subject with two pieces of 
information. We informed them of the Contraband Risk and the Search Risk. 
To communicate Contraband Risk, we showed the subject a picture of one, 
two, three, four, or ,ve cases (shown collectively in Figure !)—only one of 
which ever contained contraband. We informed subjects that (") this was the 
pool of cases from which the subject’s own case would be chosen; and (!) one, 
and only one, briefcase in that pool contained contraband. 
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 -$2,500     $3,500 ! .01 = $35 
no decision 
not carry 




dummy -$500  




!" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !#$: ! 


















Thus, if the subject saw a picture of %ve cases then that subject could 
deduce that choosing to carry a randomly-assigned case in that trial yielded a 
one-chance-in-%ve (or a &"% likelihood) of getting a case with contraband. 
Conversely, if the subject saw only one case, and understood that only one 
case would contain contraband, that subject could deduce that choosing to 
carry that case yielded a one-chance-in-one (or a !""% likelihood) of getting 
a case with contraband. And so on for two, three, and four cases. 
To signal the probability that a carried case would be searched, we showed 
each subject, on each trial, a picture of ten tunnel exits (shown collectively in 
Figure '), some number of which—either two, four, six, or eight—showed a 
guard standing prominently in the exit. As with cases, subjects could readily 
calculate that the probability of being searched was much higher if there were 
eight guards (eight-chances-in-ten, or ("%) than if there were only two 







14 Pcontr, noted in Figure $, refers to the probability of Carrying Contraband and varies from 
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As a standard precaution, and to counterbalance any e)ect on our subjects 
of the order in which we showed the two images that signal these two pieces 
of information—Contraband Risk and Search Risk, respectively—half of the 
subjects always learned of the Contraband Risk before they learned the Search 
Risk. And the other half of the subjects always learned the Search Risk before 
they learned the Contraband Risk. As we learned, this proved important. 
After learning these two pieces of information, and mindful of the payo) 
structure, subjects were tasked with indicating whether they would be willing 
to carry a case through a tunnel. The subjects understood that, if they chose 
to carry, both the case and the tunnel would be selected at random from those 
presented. After subjects registered their choices to carry or not carry, there 
was a pause of a few seconds before the subjects started over in a new trial, 
with a new allotment of hypothetical money, new information, and a new 
choice whether to carry or not carry a case.16 
 
15 Psearch, as noted in Figure &, refers to the probability of Search and varies from '% to %'%. 
16 For a given trial, subjects never learned whether a case they carried was actually searched. 
Similarly, they never learned whether the case actually contained contraband. This was important 
because we did not want our subjects’ decisions in any given trial to be in.uenced by the results of 
the previous trial. That is, we did not want our subjects to make inferences of the form, “on the last 
trial, I was carrying an empty case, so I bet I get one with contraband this time.” We wanted each 
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C. Virtues of the Paradigm 
This design has several virtues. 
First, the paradigm clearly distinguishes between subjects who are in a 
“knowing,” as distinct from “reckless,” mental state. For the “knowing” 
condition, recall that we informed subjects that one and only one case would 
ever contain contraband. For this reason, whenever a subject chooses to carry 
the single case o)ered (i.e., a case that must contain contraband), we can 
reasonably believe that, absent inconsistent behavior to the contrary, she 
knows that the case she will carry contains contraband. In comparison, 
consider the mental state of the subject when she is presented with two, three, 
four, or %ve presented cases and chooses to carry. In those situations, we can 
reasonably believe that the subject is aware of the respectively varying degrees 
of probability that she is carrying the contraband, and is therefore in a 
“reckless” state of mind. 
Second, because we did not explicitly inform our subjects of the risks—
i.e. by describing those probabilities as “*"%” or “!-in-&”—we mimicked an 
important feature of many real cases. Speci%cally, people in real-world 
situations ordinarily infer probabilities from evidence, rather than being 
presented with numeric information about probabilities. For instance, as 
someone decides whether to run the red light, there is no sign hanging in the 
air that says, “the probability of killing someone by running this red light is 
!$%.” Rather, one reaches a judgment about the probability by looking at the 
number of oncoming cars, their speed, and other similar factors. In the 
experiment, our subjects had to infer the two relevant probabilities from a 
picture of that round’s pool of cases, and a picture of tunnels (some fraction 
of which had guards in them). This is not, of course, the form that most 
evidence of probability takes in real life. But it is far closer than would be 
directly presented numerical information. 
Third, varying the chance of being caught from &"% to ("% allowed us to 
mimic another feature of real cases: people who commit crimes often decide 
to do so in part by calculating the risks of being apprehended. Juries assessing 
mens rea, however, are never asked to determine what probability the 
defendant assigned to his being caught; it is not relevant to the mens rea 
inquiry. What matters is what probability (in lay, rather than statistical terms) 
the defendant assigned to legally-relevant elements of the crime, such as 
killing someone else, or not having permission to borrow, or there being drugs 
in the briefcase he was carrying. Controlling the information about the chance 
of detection boosted our ability to do what fact%nders are asked to do: 
meaningfully distinguish between the awareness of the risk that is relevant to 
a recklessness assessment (namely the awareness of the risk that the case 
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contained contraband) from the awareness of the risk of apprehension, which 
is not relevant to the question of recklessness. 
Fourth, varying the pool of cases from one to five created the possibility that 
we might learn something about how brain states vary within the reckless mental 
state itself. That is, the brain states might vary as a function of the changing 
probabilities that one would be carrying contraband—from &"% (when five cases 
were presented) to *"% (when only two cases were presented). 
We discuss important limitations to this experiment in Part III. But the core 
idea here is that collecting data on brain activity during each trial, and analyzing 
that data in conjunction with the varying behavioral outputs (i.e., choosing, each 
trial, whether or not to carry), should afford us some window on whether, and if 
so how, neural activity varies between knowing and reckless conditions. 
D. Tools for Detecting Mens Rea 
How, exactly, did we collect and analyze the data? This subsection 
provides a brief overview of how fMRI brain-imaging works and how 
machine-learning algorithms assist in %nding useful and predictive patterns 
in the data. 
!. fMRI Brain Imaging 
Prior to the invention of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
in the early !$$"s, researchers had sophisticated tools (such as CT scans, using 
computed tomography) for measuring the physical structure of the brain, but 
somewhat limited tools (such as EEG and PET scans, using 
electroencephalography and positron emission tomography) for measuring 
brain function. fMRI signi%cantly changed all that. First, fMRI enables 
strong inferences about neural activity within and across the entire brain. 
Second, fMRI is su+ciently noninvasive that it can be used on healthy people 
without surgery or injections. 
Over the last twenty-%ve years, fMRI has become one of the world’s most 
dominant research tools for learning about brain function. Its details are both 
technical and elegant.17 
At the big picture level, the fMRI process is like a bat’s echolocation. 
Similar to how a bat sends a wide high-frequency sound at small potential 
targets, and then makes strong inferences about their locations from the 
directions of sound re,ected back, fMRI beams radio waves to the brain, and 
 
17 See, e.g., SCOTT A. HUETTEL, ALLEN W. SONG & GREGORY MCCARTHY, FUNCTIONAL 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (&d ed. $'!(); ROBERT W. BROWN, YUCHUNG N. CHENG, E. 
MARK HAACKE, MICHAEL R. THOMPSON & RAMESH VENKATESAN, MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING ($d ed. $'!(). 
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enables inferences from the di)erential patterns in energy that returns from 
within brain tissues. More speci%cally, fMRI allows researchers to discover 
and monitor both the locations of changes in blood ,ow, and the amounts of 
those changes, correlated with the di)erent moments in each subject’s 
information-gathering, information-processing, and decisionmaking tasks, as 
well as with the %nal decision itself. 
Researchers place a subject on her back within a large tube that is surrounded 
by massive, super-cooled, super-conducting wire coils arranged to move 
electrical energy in a particular pattern. The coils are arranged to create a very 
strong magnetic field within the scanner that can be exquisitely manipulated 
(and even graduated in strength) along the axes of length, width, and height. 
To understand how this works, you must also understand that: First, all 
atoms (including those in the body) contain some spinning particles, each 
bearing an electrical charge. Second, spinning objects with an electrical 
charge are, in themselves, tiny magnets. Third, placing a person within a 
strong magnetic %eld of an MRI tends to align the axes of spin of their 
subatomic particles, just as metal %lings on paper will align with a %eld of a 
magnet held underneath. 
Let’s now connect this to neurons in the brain. Neurons are the cells that 
carry electrical impulses from one end to another and that, by virtue of their 
interactions within the brain, enable everything from perception to decision 
to action. Like all cells, they need nutrients supplied by the blood, like 
oxygen, to live and function. The more active neurons are, the more 
oxygenated blood they need. 
Which brings us to the happy fortuity that enables fMRI to discover 
things about brain function: oxygenated blood cells (which bring oxygen to 
the neurons) and de-oxygenated blood cells (which have already o)-loaded 
their oxygen to neurons) have di)erent magnetic properties. The signi%cance 
is this: when an MRI “pings” (so to speak) a brain in the scanner, certain 
subatomic particles that are all spinning in the same axis are temporarily 
bumped out of alignment. When the signal stops, and those subatomic 
particles snap back into alignment with the magnetic %eld, they release a 
certain amount of energy, which can be spatially located, in the brain, by an 
array of receivers in the MRI machine. 
Because fMRI technology can detect changing ratios in oxygenated and 
deoxygenated blood, over both time and space, researchers can make inferences 
about where different brain regions are most and least active during each trial of 
the experiment. Researchers then compare that information either to a baseline 
of brain activity (the so-called “resting state,” when an awake brain is simply 
talking quietly to itself, without any specific task to perform, other than normal 
bodily functions) or to a contrasting set of decisions that task the brain in 
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different ways. This enables researchers to learn about how the brain operated 
during the particular decisions they are studying. 
Put another way, just as a bat can place a mosquito in airspace, on the basis 
of re,ected sound waves, fMRI can detect increases and decreases, within 
brain space, in the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood. And this in 
turn enables strong inferences about where and when, in the brain, neurons 
are working harder. 
&. fMRI in Our Experiment 
Our experiment used fMRI technology, as just described, to scan a subject 
continuously as that subject (!) sees each scenario stimulus on a screen; (&) 
processes what it means; (') makes decisions about whether or not to carry a 
case; and (-) registers that decision behaviorally by pressing one of two 
buttons with her %ngers. 
Neurons work harder when a person is seeing, processing information, 
deciding, and pressing a button than when the person is not engaged in these 
activities. That calls up more blood to deliver more resources. In the same 
way that transitioning from a jog to a sprint has our muscles calling up more 
oxygen and energy from the blood, neurons that are working harder call up 
more oxygen and energy as well. 
Throughout the entire process through which our subjects assessed the 
probabilities and decided whether to carry the case across the border, the 
scanner recorded data from the entire brain about where, when, and how 
oxygenated and deoxygenated blood ratios were changing. Because we knew 
exactly what each subject was seeing when, and also knew exactly when and 
what the decision output was (i.e. to carry or not to carry), we could correlate 
di)erent patterns of brain activity with the di)erent probability combinations 
and with the di)erent decisions each subject reported. 
Each subject was in the scanner for about forty minutes. Since we 
measured changing oxygenated blood levels in tens of thousands of brain 
locations during that period, there were literally millions of pieces of data 
collected about each subject. To analyze those data, we deployed a form of 
arti%cial intelligence known as a machine learning algorithm. 
'. The Machine Learning Algorithm 
“Machine learning” describes a process by which a software program can 
“learn” the associations between various inputs, conditions, and outputs.18 In our 
case, the inputs are the brain data. The conditions are the separate risks, within 
 
18 See, e.g., IAN GOODFELLOW, YOSHUA BENGIO & AARON COURVILLE, DEEP LEARNING 
+)-!)! ($'!)). 
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each given trial of carrying contraband and being searched. And the outputs are 
the subjects’ choices whether or not to carry, given these conditions. 
The core idea is that if you train the algorithm by showing it actual data 
from actual subjects, the software attempts to %nd the most common patterns 
within that data set. It can then use those patterns to predict how to classify 
the subject’s mental state, during a given trial, into a knowing or reckless state 
of mind, using brain data alone. The machine “learns” what patterns of brain 
activity are associated with being in a knowing mental state by comparing the 
fMRI data gathered when subjects were contemplating carrying a single 
briefcase. And the machine “learns” how those patterns di)er from the brain 
activity associated with being in a reckless mental state by comparing them 
with the brain activity when the subjects were contemplating a pool of two, 
three, four, or %ve briefcases. 
We used a particularly sophisticated algorithm, known as “the elastic 
net,”19 that learned not just from the data, but also from the failures and 
successes of other e)orts to learn from the data. We can clarify what that 
means with an analogy. 
Imagine a teacher who, in her %rst year in the classroom, tries to teach her 
students to identify birds by showing them pictures. She puts a slide up on 
the screen and says, “Robin!” and then another and says, “Cardinal!” and then 
moves on to other slides of other species. Before her second year of teaching, 
she reviews the students’ performance from the %rst year and %nds that some 
of the pictures she showed were more useful than others for teaching the 
students. The students were confused by some pictures and found others 
more helpful. Perhaps they did exceptionally well at identifying cardinals 
shown from the front, on their %nal exam, and there is only one picture in 
the stack of a cardinal from that angle. From that result, she concludes that 
that one picture in the stack was particularly pedagogically useful. She repeats 
the process for other species and makes extra copies of the useful pictures, 
adding them to her stack. 
Our hypothetical teacher then tries again the following year with a new 
group of students. They see all the original pictures, shown to the prior set of 
students, but the pictures that were useful last year they see more than once. 
The teacher reviews again. She %nds that, even among the pictures she made 
extra copies of, some were exceptionally helpful to the students. She makes 
further extra copies of those and adds them to the stack, creating a new, even 
better stack to use for next year’s students. And so on. In her tenth year of 
teaching, she has a great stack of photos, far better than her %rst-year stack. 
 
19 See, e.g., Hui Zou & Trevor Hastie, Regularization and Variable Selection Via the Elastic Net, )* 
J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y SERIES B &'! ($'',). 
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The tenth-year students, as a result, are fantastic at identifying birds from 
pictures, much better than the %rst-year cohort. 
Our algorithm learned in a way analogous to this and so became better 
and better at classifying knowing and reckless mental states across several 
generations. Algorithms that work this way are sometimes called “pattern 
classi%ers.” And using such classi%ers with respect to brain data is sometimes 
called “multi-voxel pattern analysis” or MVPA for short (where a “voxel” is 
like a three-dimensional pixel volume in the brain, such as a two-by-two-by-
two-millimeter cube). 
Another example makes clearer how this can work. Suppose we wanted to 
see if a machine learning algorithm could reliably determine whether a person 
whose brain was scanned with fMRI was looking, at the time the brain data 
in question were acquired, at a photo of a face, or a photo of a place. 
We could feed the algorithm brain data from when a bunch of di)erent 
subjects are seeing faces, and “tell” the algorithm, essentially: “These data are 
all from condition one, which we will call ‘faces.’” We could then feed the 
algorithm brain data from a bunch of subjects who were at the time seeing 
places and “tell” the algorithm “These data are all from condition two, which 
we will call ‘places.’” Then we could show the algorithm new unlabeled brain 
data from a single subject and ask it to determine, on the basis of di)erences 
it observes between the two conditions, whether this person was in fact 
looking at a face or a place at the time the brain data were acquired. 
The greater the di)erences between the aggregate sets of condition one 
and condition two brain data, the better will be the algorithm’s ability to 
predict what the unknown subject was looking at. In laboratory conditions, 
when researchers actually know what this mystery subject was looking at, but 
are testing the e)ectiveness of the algorithm, the accuracy of that prediction 
can be quanti%ed (such as, say, ($% accurate). The more accurate the 
algorithm, the more con%dence researchers can have about the predictions 
the algorithm can make with respect to subjects whose stimuli are not known 
to researchers. Consequently, if researchers are using a training method like 
the elastic net, they can then use their degree of con%dence to alter their 
training method, emphasizing the particularly useful, and representative parts 
of the %rst round training data to retrain in the second round, in order to 
improve predictive power. And so on. 
In like fashion, we %rst set our algorithm the task of predicting whether 
one of our research subjects was in a knowing or reckless mental state, during 
any particular trial in the scanner. Second, we set our algorithm the task of 
predicting whether a subject in a reckless mental state was seeing two, three, 
four, or %ve cases. Third, we set our algorithm the task of predicting how 
many guarded tunnels (representing search risk) the subject was seeing at a 
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given moment. Finally, we set the algorithm to predict whether or not, given 
the brain data observed, a subject was about to choose to carry, or to decline 
to carry, the case. 
-. Testing the Machine Learning Algorithm 
Many statistical techniques can test the accuracy and reliability of a 
machine learning algorithm. We used a common technique rather 
descriptively called “leave-one-out cross-validation.”20 
There are more subtleties and complexities to this technique than we 
expect readers will want to know.21 But the key idea is that you can train the 
algorithm repeatedly, and independently, on one subset of data already 
collected, and ask it to make predictions about the other subset. By 
continuously and precisely changing the subsets, you can get a very clear 
sense of the algorithm’s accuracy. 
For instance, if you have collected brain data on forty subjects, you can 
have the algorithm learn from subjects one through thirty-nine, and then 
make a prediction about subject forty. Then you can start over, having the 
algorithm learn from subjects two through forty, and then make a prediction 
about subject one. And so on, always leaving one subject out, systematically 
varying which subject that is. This method of repeated testing gives clear 
indications of the algorithm’s accuracy. If the algorithm does well in 
classifying the subject who was left out of the training set, no matter which 
subject that is, then that gives you greater con%dence that the algorithm is 
tracking what it should be tracking.22 
 
20 See Leave-One-Out Cross-Validation, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MACH. LEARNING, https://doi.org/ 
!'.!''*/+*%-'-&%*-&'!)(-%_()+ [https://perma.cc/Q*XV-E(VW] (last visited Sept. !&, $'$'). 
21 Interested readers can #nd much more information on our methods for training the 
classi#ers in Predicting, supra note +, and on pages four and #ve of the associated Supporting 
Information. See Vilares et al., Supporting Information for Predicting the Knowledge-Recklessness 
Distinction in the Human Brain, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., https://www.pnas.org/ 
content/pnas/suppl/$'!*/'&/'%/!)!+&%,!!(.DCSupplemental/pnas.$'!)!+&%,SI.pdf (last visited Oct. 
!%, $'$') [https://perma.cc/&NQZ-UL$U]. For more on classi#ers, see Kenneth A. Norman, Sean 
M. Polyn, Greg J. Detre & James V. Haxby, Beyond Mind-Reading: Multi-Voxel Pattern Analysis of 
fMRI Data, !' TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. ($( ($'')); Frank Tong & Michael S. Pratte, Decoding 
Patterns of Human Brain Activity, )& ANN. REV. PSYCH. (%& ($'!$); Thomas Naselaris, Kendrick N. 
Kay, Shinji Nishimoto & Jack L. Gallant, Encoding and Decoding in fMRI, ,) NEUROIMAGE ('' 
($'!!); John-Dylan Haynes, A Primer on Pattern-Based Approaches to fMRI: Principles, Pitfalls, and 
Perspectives, %* PRIMER $,* ($'!,). 
22 We did some further work to assess the algorithm’s accuracy, an appreciation of which 
requires that we introduce here, for more technically inclined readers, some additional subtleties 
about the way these algorithms work. So far, we have been speaking as though the post-training 
algorithm tells you, full stop, whether the brain data that you o"er it was recorded from a reckless 
or a knowing subject. But, in fact, that’s not what these algorithms produce. Rather, they provide 
you with a degree of con$dence that the subject was reckless or knowing. They say that, for instance, 
there is a probability of '.$ that the subject was knowing, or a probability of '.*,. They assign a 
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E. Primary Findings 
To recap, we asked our subjects to play a game while we scanned their 
brains. They each made !&* decisions as to whether to carry a briefcase across 
the border when given varying information about the probability that the 
briefcase contained contraband (the Contraband Risk) and the probability 
that the case would be searched at the border (the Search Risk). 
We then built an algorithm—a digital machine, essentially—that takes 
brain data as an input and returns one of two outputs: reckless or knowing 
(with respect to the contents of the briefcase). The output is the machine’s 
best guess about the mental state of the person whose brain data it takes as 
an input. We then used a variety of tools for measuring how well the machine 
worked. We measured how well it did with the very job that we ask fact%nders 
to do whenever we ask them to determine whether a criminal defendant was 
reckless or knowing. However, unlike the fact%nder, we used only 
information about a person’s brain instead of evidence admitted in court. 
Here are the two most important results. 
 
number between ' and ! that represents the likelihood that the subject was in the same mental state 
as those in the training set, given what it learned from studying the training set. 
What this means is that a further decision needs to be made in order to use the algorithm to actually 
classify subjects into the knowing or the reckless category: we need to decide how confident the algorithm 
needs to be in its classification before we will put the subject in the knowing or reckless category that the 
algorithm recommends. Do we want to classify the subject as knowing when the algorithm’s confidence 
is above '.&? How about '.,? Or above '.*,? Or above '.+,? Or what? What is the appropriate threshold 
above which we pull the trigger and classify the subject as knowing (or reckless)? 
Note that wherever you place the threshold, there will be inaccuracy that could have been 
avoided by placing the threshold elsewhere. If you place the threshold at '.*,, for instance, then 
subjects that the algorithm identi#es as '.) will not be classi#ed as knowing, even though quite a 
few of them were looking at a single briefcase when the relevant brain data was recorded. However, 
if you lower the threshold to '.), in order to classify them correctly, you will thereby misclassify 
those subjects who were merely reckless and who the algorithm assigned values between '.) and 
'.*,. Wherever you set the threshold, there will be false positives (reckless people who are classi#ed 
as knowing), and false negatives (knowing people who are classi#ed as reckless). 
The question is where the optimal threshold is. At what threshold do you get the best mix of 
false positives and false negatives? This is a statistically soluble problem. Another important 
question, however, is how many choices of threshold provide you with a powerful classi#catory tool? 
Does the algorithm do quite well when the threshold is set anywhere between '., and '.+, for 
instance? Or does it only perform well between '.*, and '.*%? As a general rule, an algorithm used 
for classi#cation is better if it is more robust, if it performs well for a wider range of choices of 
threshold. So that, itself, provides a measure of an algorithm’s value. If it performs well over a wide 
range of choices of threshold, then that is a good reason to think that it is learning the right things 
from the training data. This was also part of our analysis. We assessed the value of the algorithm by 
seeing how robustly it provided accurate results over a range of thresholds. 
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!. Knowing and Reckless Brain States Di)er 
Our paramount %nding is this: our algorithm correctly classi%ed people 
as knowing or reckless .!% of the time, in some conditions. 
Recall that prior empirical work has demonstrated that ordinary people, 
asked to classify people as knowing or reckless, are only slightly more likely 
to get a correct answer than we would get if we were to ,ip a coin. (That is, 
just above *"%.) 
Our algorithm, by contrast, outperformed ordinary people, not to 
mention coin-,ips, by a signi%cant margin; we outperformed chance by &!% 
and outperformed ordinary people by almost that same amount. And unlike 
ordinary people, who draw on a wide range of evidence about human behavior 
in making their decisions about another’s mental state, the algorithm used 
only information about brain activity supplied by an fMRI. 
It is this result that makes this experiment worth reporting to a legally-
minded audience. In a sense, our algorithm was able (again, in some 
conditions) to read minds by looking at brains. And it did not read a trivial 
aspect of mind; it read an aspect of mind crucial to mens rea, and therefore 
to criminal punishment. 
Put simply: by combining fMRI brain-imaging techniques with a machine 
learning algorithm, we were able to distinguish among guilty minds. 
&. Order of Information Matters 
Last section we twice indicated that we could make distinctions, on brain 
data alone, “in some conditions.” That is an important caveat, and one we 
wish to clarify. The caveat concerns the order in which subjects received risk-
relevant information. 
Recall that half our subjects were first presented with information about the 
size of the pool of briefcases and then shown information about the likelihood 
that they would be searched at the border (we called this “the Contraband-First 
Condition”). The other half of our subjects saw these two pieces of information 
in reverse order (we called this “the Search-First Condition”). 
Interestingly, our algorithm was excellent at classifying the mental states 
of those in the Search-First Condition and abysmal at classifying the mental 
states of those in the Contraband-First Condition. Where, as just mentioned, 
the algorithm correctly classi%ed subjects .!% of the time if they %rst saw the 
information about the likelihood of being searched, the algorithm succeeded 
in correctly classifying only '&.!% of the time when examining information 
about the brains of those who %rst saw information about the likelihood that 
their briefcase contained contraband. 
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The di)erence between the two sequences in which subjects received 
information was also re,ected in the behavior of our subjects. They were far 
less likely to choose to carry the briefcase across the border if they were 
presented %rst with the likelihood of being searched, and second with the 
likelihood that the case contained contraband, than if they saw the pieces of 
information in reverse order. For instance, when our subjects were faced with 
a -"% chance of being searched, and were presented with only one case to 
carry, our subjects chose to carry under -"% of the time in the Contraband-
First condition, but over #"% of the time in the Search-First condition. This 
same behavioral discrepancy was found, importantly, when the probabilities 
of the various possible payo)s from carrying were held constant. Put another 
way: tell someone that they have a high chance of being searched, but almost 
no chance their briefcase contains contraband, and they are much less likely 
to choose to carry it than if you tell them that there is almost no chance the 
case contains contraband, but there is a high probability of being searched. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF DETECTING MENS REA IN THE BRAIN 
A. Immediate Legal Implications 
The primary %nding of our study has several important implications. 
First, our team’s experiment provides a clear answer to the question: Does 
the distinction between knowing and reckless mens rea re,ect a detectable 
distinction between brain states? The answer is: yes. 
Based on current evidence, the distinction is not simply projected onto 
people who are intrinsically no di)erent from one another. Put another way, 
the supposed distinction is no more in the eye of the beholder than detectable 
di)erences in the brain are in the eye of the beholder. 
The alternative hypothesis, recall, is that the legal de%nitions of knowing 
and reckless do not apply di)erentially thanks to di)erent psychological 
features of defendants. They instead re,ect, on that view, independently 
formulated judgments about which defendants should be punished more 
severely. But that hypothesis is not consistent with the data we collected. 
Using a combination of fMRI brain imaging and an algorithmic artificial 
intelligence, we were able to quite reliably predict—on the basis of brain activity 
alone—whether or not a subject was in a knowing or reckless mental state. This 
suggests that differential liability can legitimately rest, if we retain our collective 
decision for it to do so, on there being a distinction between knowing and 
reckless mental states of the kind that is reflected in distinct neural activity. Our 
main finding is inconsistent with any argument that these distinctions between 
knowing and reckless are arbitrary, invented, or merely provide cover for juries 
or judges to punish some defendants more than others. 
&& University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !#$: ! 
Although our main %nding was not true in all conditions (recall that when 
subjects receive Contraband Risk information before receiving Search Risk 
information the algorithm could not accurately distinguish the reckless from 
the knowing) the fact that it was true in any conditions strongly suggests 
(subject, of course, to future studies that may replicate and extend our 
%ndings) that there is a brain di)erence between those the law classi%es as 
knowing or as reckless. 
Of course, it is possible that there are some real-world circumstances 
under which there is no meaningful di)erence between the knowing and the 
reckless mental states. But, given that we found an intrinsic di)erence in 
some experimental conditions, a more parsimonious hypothesis is that there 
is a brain di)erence, even under those other circumstances, that fMRI cannot 
(so far) detect. 
The Model Penal Code’s assumption that those whom it classifies differently 
based on their mental states actually differ psychologically has never before been 
directly tested. While we do not suggest that the results of a single study in any 
domain could ever lay a question to rest forever, our study should be seen as 
significantly increasing the likelihood that there are brain-based differences 
between people who are in knowing and reckless mental states. The main 
implication of our study is: whatever the relative merits of keeping or 
eliminating the distinction, calls for reform to eliminate the distinction are on 
considerably weaker ground, empirically, than they were previously. 
Second, our results lend support for the idea that jurors need more help 
%guring out how to distinguish knowing from reckless mental states in real 
cases. Behavioral experiments in a separate set of published studies strongly 
suggest that jurors are quite poor at distinguishing between these two mental 
states in the way the Model Penal Code instructs they must. If our brain-
imaging results had found no di)erences between the two mental states, and 
people cannot reliably distinguish them anyway, then a concern for justice 
would recommend possible elimination of the distinction between the two. 
But if instead there are distinctions in the brain, and jurors have a hard time 
sorting defendants between the two mental states, this recommends that we 
%nd a way to do a better job at instructing jurors how to sort accurately. If we 
are going to keep a system that punishes people in the knowing category more 
than people in the reckless category, then we should ensure that jurors 
perform very signi%cantly above chance (*"%) when assigning defendants to 
one category or the other. 
Third, our neuroscientific methods suggest the Model Penal Code mental 
state categories may not be nearly as unitary as currently supposed. That is, there 
may be important subcategories, and multiple subtypes, of culpable mental 
states. More specifically, our study suggests that the distinction between 
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knowing and reckless mental states may be greatest when subjects perceive 
information about the presence or absence of an element of a crime after they 
learn information about the likelihood of being caught. The distinction may be 
less obvious, or absent, when subjects perceive risks in the reverse order. 
This suggests, but does not prove, that the criminal justice system is on 
shakier ground, perhaps, in sorting some defendants into reckless and 
knowing compared to other defendants. Those who are mistaken, for 
instance, about the illegality of their conduct—they think what they are doing 
is legal and so not subject to punishment—at the time that they commit a 
crime are possibly worse targets for classi%cation into the categories of 
knowing and reckless than those who know when they act that they are 
engaging in illegal activity, and so are at risk of being caught. There may be 
a far less meaningful distinction between knowing and reckless conduct when 
the actor is uncertain, or unaware, of the illegality of his conduct. 
This, in turn, raises the question whether policymakers should consider 
keeping the knowing versus reckless bifurcation for some de%ned 
circumstances or types of crimes, and eliminating it for others. To be clear, 
we are not advocating this (or any other) legal reform; rather we are pointing 
out the possibility of such reform as a potential application of our %ndings. 
Fourth, our team’s experiment provides a concrete example of how 
neuroscienti%c methods can open new avenues for discovering answers to 
some of the law’s enduring questions. On the one hand, we hasten to add that 
we are not zealots at the altar of a brain-scanning machine. We do not think 
that brain-scanning will entirely upend long-standing legal approaches to 
issues in either criminal law or civil law. We are pragmatists, observing the 
potential utility of new technology and associated methods. On the other 
hand, we believe this study clearly and amply demonstrates that there are 
some questions relevant to law as to which brain scanning can provide 
valuable new information. And the signi%cance of this—entirely independent 
of the experiment’s value in the substantive context of mens rea—should not 
be underestimated. 
B. Implications for Future Work 
The implications of our study extend beyond the boundary between 
knowing and reckless mental states. Our study points the way toward future 
studies and avenues of research, each with distinct legal implications of their 
own. These avenues concern: (!) other lines between mental states, drawn by 
the Model Penal Code; (&) other de%ned elements of crimes; and (') the 
interaction of mental illness and criminal mental states. 
First, the line between knowing and reckless, which our experiment 
investigated, is only one mens rea line drawn by the Model Penal Code. Similar 
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studies, therefore, could be done to determine whether purpose and knowledge 
can be distinguished based on brain data alone, or whether recklessness and 
negligence can be. Further, the Model Penal Code’s divisions are not the only 
mens rea distinctions drawn in American law. The Model Penal Code also 
equates awareness of high probability with knowledge under certain 
circumstances.23 Do we lose the ability to distinguish between those two under 
the special circumstances in which the Model Penal Code equates them, or not? 
Second, when we move beyond the Model Penal Code’s mens rea regime 
we %nd various other questions that could be explored using the sort of tools 
we developed for this study. For instance, many jurisdictions in the United 
States reserve the most severe penalties for murders that are “willful, 
deliberate and premeditated.”24 Is it possible to distinguish acts performed 
with that frame of mind, from those that are not, solely based on brain data? 
Third, our study speci%cally concerned knowledge and recklessness with 
respect to a circumstantial element of a crime—the presence or absence of 
contraband in the case, a fact that accompanies, but need not be caused by, 
the act of crossing the border. It is possible that we would not %nd the same, 
or any, brain-based di)erence even when it comes to other circumstantial 
elements of crimes. 
Perhaps, for instance, the line between knowledge and recklessness when it 
comes to another’s consent—the absence of which can also be a circumstantial 
element of a crime—cannot be drawn neurally, or must be drawn differently. 
Further work could investigate different forms of potentially illegal behavior also 
involving circumstantial elements. Further work could also expand beyond 
circumstantial elements to result and act elements of crimes. We do not know 
whether our results would extend to mens rea at the time of the act with respect 
to future harms that the act might cause. 
Fourth, with further development, our team’s work could be extended to 
investigate the interaction of mental illness with criminally-culpable mental 
states, about which we have almost no evidence-based knowledge. Except in 
those rare states that bar the use of evidence of mental disorder to negate 
mens rea,25 defendants routinely introduce evidence of the existence of 
certain recognized mental disorders—schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, autism spectrum disorder, and depression, for example—to raise 
 
23 See MODEL PENAL CODE § $.'$(*) (AM. LAW INST. !+%,) (“When knowledge of the 
existence of a particular fact is an element of an o"ense, such knowledge is established if a person is 
aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”). 
24 According to Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, this is true in $+ states and D.C., as well as at the 
federal level. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting Premeditation’s Demise, *, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. %&, %( & n.& ($'!$). 
25 See Paul H. Robinson, Murder Mitigation in the Fifty-Two American Jurisdictions: A Case Study 
in Doctrinal Interrelation Analysis, (* TEX. TECH L. REV. !+, $( ($'!(). 
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reasonable doubt about the presence of the required mens rea element of the 
crime. But there are to date no studies that directly examine the impact of 
mental disorders on mens rea. 
Fact%nders receive some guidance from clinicians and forensic 
psychiatrists. But these experts’ judgments are not supported by systematic, 
experimental %ndings. It is not hard to see why: to investigate the question 
of whether PTSD su)erers, for example, are more likely than non-PTSD 
su)erers to know, as opposed to being reckless about, features of their 
environment that bear on their criminality, we would need a way of measuring 
which mental state they are in, under lab conditions. Our study shows that 
tools for making such measurements can be developed, from combining 
existing fMRI technology with methods of arti%cial intelligence. 
For similar reasons, our study shows that these tools can help to measure the 
impact of intoxicants on mens rea. Although there are significant limitations on 
how voluntary intoxication can be used to negate mens rea, most states allow 
defendants to shield themselves from liability on the grounds that due to 
intoxication they failed to know something, even if they would have known it 
had they been sober.26 There are many different intoxicants, of course, and they 
vary enormously in their psychological effects. Yet there is no data-driven work, 
akin to the experiment we’ve just described, that investigates the differential 
impact of, for instance, alcohol, cocaine, methamphetamine or marijuana on the 
“knowing” mental state. There now could be. 
III. CAUTIONS & CAVEATS 
The brain imaging method we used—fMRI—is a fairly recent 
technological advance, and a remarkable technique for learning about brain 
activity in a relatively non-invasive way. For this reason, publication of MRI 
and fMRI studies from major universities (which can pay several million 
dollars for a high %eld-strength machine) has exploded. For instance, a 
literature search in the widely-used PubMed database revealed that although 
in !$(. fewer than &"" articles using these two methods were published each 
month, by &"!- that %gure was typically greater than &,""" per month27—a 
ten-fold increase in twenty-six years. Looking just at fMRI publications, a 
 
26 This is the case under Model Penal Code § $.'%, which many states have adopted. See, e.g., 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § $C:$-%(b) (West $'!)). Other states have reached the same result with di"erent 
statutory language. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § $!-,$',(b) ($'!!). 
27 Nikki Marinsek, %" Years of Trends in the MRI and fMRI Literatures, NIKKI MARINSEK: BLOG 
(Dec. !%, $'!*), https://nikkimarinsek.com/blog/fmri-bursts [https://perma.cc/TG)%-EC*Z]. 
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&"!" study in the same database found a rise in annual publications from 
e)ectively zero in !$$& to well over &,""" annually in &""$.28 
At the same time, we want readers to understand that we pitch down the 
middle—neither more zealous nor more skeptical about the technology than 
fMRI is due. Studies by our working group, by other working groups in our 
Research Network, and by other research teams around the world, have 
demonstrated that neuroscienti%c techniques can add value to law’s e)orts. 
But brain-scanning is not magic. It has limitations, many of which we have 
helped to explore and detail.29 For this reason, we believe it is appropriate to 
lay on the table a variety of cautions that might help readers to strike the 
right balance between under- and over-interpreting the speci%c %ndings we 
describe here, as well as fMRI studies in general.30 
A. General Cautions & Caveats 
First, there is always a trade-o) between how closely experimental 
conditions align with the real world and how many potential variables, any 
one of which might in,uence a subject’s behavior, can be controlled. Increased 
realism decreases con%dence in conclusions about what actually caused what. 
Yet increased control over variables decreases con%dence in the 
generalizability of a study’s %ndings, which might only hold true in identically 
controlled circumstances. Although we have no reason at present to think that 
brain activity di)erences between knowing and reckless frames of mind are 
only di)erent inside the scanner, transparency requires that we at least 
mention the possibility. 
Second, although our sample size of forty subjects is within the norm in 
fMRI brain imaging studies, for investigating brain activity with su+cient 
statistical power to publish %ndings in top peer-reviewed neuroscience 
journals, there is always the possibility that a larger study would %nd either 
more or fewer di)erences between the knowing and reckless mental states. 
 
28 Lars Muckli, What Are We Missing Here? Brain Imaging Evidence for Higher Cognitive Functions 
in Primary Visual Cortex V&, $' INT’L J. IMAGING SYS. & TECH. !&!, !&$ ($'!'). 
29 See Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience: Recommendations Submitted to the President’s 
Bioethics Commission, ! J.L. & BIOSCIENCES $$( ($'!(); see also OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL 
& FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE !$*-,' ($d ed., $'$!); Owen D. Jones, Joshua W. 
Buckholtz, Jeffrey D. Schall & Rene Marois, Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
$''+ STAN. TECH. L. REV. , [hereinafter Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers]; Russell A. Poldrack, The Role 
of fMRI in Cognitive Neuroscience: Where Do We Stand?, !% CURRENT OP. NEUROBIOLOGY $$& ($''%); 
John T. Cacioppo, Gary G. Berntson, Tyler S. Lorig, Catherine J. Norris, Edith Rickett & Howard 
Nusbaum, Just Because You’re Imaging the Brain Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop Using Your Head: A Primer and 
Set of First Principles, %, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. ),' ($''&). 
30 For more on these subjects, see Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers, supra note $+. 
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Third, sampling different demographic groups might yield different results. 
Our subjects are from the Roanoke/Blacksburg, Virginia area. Although there is 
at present no reason to believe that different groups will use their brains quite 
differently with respect to mens rea, we would be remiss not to mention the 
possibility that variables such as age, profession, education, sex, nationality, 
nutrition, health, or socioeconomic status could affect the results. 
Fourth, fMRI is an indirect, rather than direct, measure of neuronal 
activity. Instead of measuring the electrical activity of individual neurons, or 
even a group of them, fMRI detects changes in blood oxygenation levels, over 
time, in discrete locations within a subject’s brain that include neurons, as 
well as other brain tissue. There is every physiological reason to believe that 
the more various neurons %re, the more resources (such as oxygen and 
glucose) they demand. Still, it is a little like distinguishing cities from 
countryside by measuring di)erential regional light outputs from space at 
night. In the same way that that would measure something very reliably 
associated with cities, but would not be a direct observation of cities 
themselves, fMRI measures something very reliably associated with neuronal 
activity, without measuring the neuronal %rings themselves. 
Fifth, fMRI cannot identify di)erences between the kinds of neurons that 
are active. fMRI compares total activity within voxels (which are, as 
mentioned earlier, cubic volumes of brain tissue). But each voxel contains a 
great many neurons in number—usually estimated as over #"","""—and can 
also contain many di)erent types of neurons. Some neurons, for instance, %re 
in a way that activates other neurons. But some neurons %re in a way that 
inhibits the activation of other neurons. Because fMRI does not distinguish 
among these sometimes competing purposes of neurons, it is akin to 
recording the decibel level in a crowd of people, many of whom are yelling 
“go,” some of whom are yelling “no,” and some of whom are keeping quiet. 
Sixth, the fMRI brain images that researchers present and publish are not 
like x-ray images, which are the direct result of imaging technology 
interacting with brain tissue. fMRI images are, instead, statistical parametric 
maps. Which means they are structural images (akin to an x-ray image) of a 
single, typical brain onto which has been overlaid a patchwork variety of 
colors, in various locations, that represent the voxels with the most 
statistically signi%cant di)erences between conditions. (Such as, in our case, 
the knowing and reckless conditions.) The colors are calibrated to the range 
of greater and lesser di)erences. 
Seventh, as tempting as it can be to laud the breakthrough capabilities of 
partnering machine-learning algorithms with brain-scanners, it is also 
important for legal thinkers to see their limitations with a clear eye, and to 
not succumb to temptation to overinterpret results. Speci%cally, we believe 
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that although multivoxel pattern classi%cation is a powerful tool for 
identifying the existence of salient brain di)erences, it will rarely provide 
strong support for claims about either (!) the precise function of any brain 
region; or (&) any brain region’s centrality to any particular and complex form 
of psychological functioning. Although algorithms are capable of learning to 
apply complex, disjunctive rules for classi%cation, rules of that kind are not 
automatically useful for gaining insight into the basic psycho-physical laws 
that govern the relationship between brain activity and psychological states. 
B. Speci!c Cautions & Caveats 
There are a variety of things that our experiment could be taken to imply 
that it does not imply. And these are important to highlight. 
First, and most importantly, scienti%c %ndings never provide automatic 
support for a change in policy (or, conversely, a continuation of existing 
policy). So our %ndings don’t either. Sound policymaking or policy-reform 
always requires that policy-makers view facts through the prism of values and 
consider them in light of fundamental normative principles. Put another way, 
there is no automatic pathway from description to prescription, or from 
explanation to justi%cation. Facts warrant attention, of course. But whether 
they should inspire change depends on what it is that society is trying to 
accomplish, and what principles it must comply with in the e)ort. In context, 
that means that if a state’s statutory regime establishing di)erent criminally 
culpable mental states is structured by and grounded on the assumption that 
there really are brain-based di)erences in those mental states, then facts 
supporting that assumption tend to increase our con%dence in the regime. 
And facts inconsistent with that assumption tend to weaken it.   
Neither the results of our experiment, nor the results of any experiment, 
can alone answer the question whether we should or should not keep four 
categories of mental state, much less the four particular categories de%ned in 
the Model Penal Code. The fact that our experiment has found a brain-based 
distinction between knowing and reckless mental states cannot automatically 
justify the continued division of those states in the law, any more than would 
the absence of such a %nding demand the elimination of the distinction. To 
be clear, the implication of our %nding is not that the law must retain the 
knowing-reckless distinction; it is, instead, that to the extent that the best policies 
require that the mens rea categories re#ect di"erences in brain states, our %nding 
provides some support for maintaining the distinction. But whether the best 
policies require that is a profoundly di+cult question that cannot be answered 
by doing experiments. 
Second, our team’s neuroscienti%c techniques can discover brain-based 
di)erences between mental states that exist at the time of scanning, not at 
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some prior time. Although we have developed and deployed a powerful tool for 
exploring whether such di)erences exist, it is not (at least not so far) a tool 
for reliably exploring what mental state a subject was in minutes, hours, days, 
or even years beforehand. Put another way, our current experiment has 
implications for criminal justice policy, but not for forensic evaluation of 
individual defendants. 
Third, the extent to which our study read the minds of subjects should 
not be exaggerated. True, it is remarkable, frankly, that the algorithm could 
classify subjects as knowing or reckless taking only information about their 
brains, collected non-invasively, into account. Such a thing would have been 
inconceivable twenty-%ve years ago. But that does not imply we now have a 
general-purpose mind-reading capability. Instead, our experiment showed 
that there were su+ciently great di)erences between knowing and reckless 
brain activity that the combination of fMRI and arti%cial intelligence could 
learn that di)erence (not just—on its own—discover and name the di)erence). 
The crucial distinction, and the point we are emphasizing here, is that human 
instructors had to provide the algorithm with two potentially di)erent 
conditions to examine, in the %rst place. Had we not asked the algorithm to 
look for di)erences in subjects between these two conditions, it would not, 
on its own, have looked for (or thereby found) any. 
Fourth, it is worth noting that we have not yet said in this article what 
kinds of activities, in which particular brain structures, enabled our algorithm 
to distinguish between subjects in knowing and reckless states of mind. The 
reason we have said nothing about this so far is not that our study has nothing 
to say. It does.31 The region known as the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, for 
instance (a region known to be involved in planning, analysis, and 
deliberation) was among the regions of the brain that behaved distinctively 
in subjects in states of knowledge. For purposes of our speci%c research 
question—whether knowing and reckless mental states are distinguishable in 
the brain—the locations of di)erences is simply less legally relevant than the 
fact that discernable di)erences exist. That is, the central result that we 
reached—distinguishing knowledge from recklessness solely on the basis of 
brain data—is signi%cant quite independently of what aspects of the brain 
made the result possible. 
Fifth, the stimuli we used in the lab to elicit the mental states to be studied 
may or may not elicit those mental states perfectly. We strongly believe that 
 
31 Interested readers can #nd details in Predicting, supra note +. In brief, areas more predictive 
of being in a knowing situation included the anterior insula (often involved in risk and uncertainty 
representation), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (associated with executive decisions and 
computation) and temporo-parietal junction (often involved in moral decisions). Areas more 
predictive of being in a reckless mental state include the occipital cortex (sometimes involved in 
circumstances of high uncertainty). See id. at &$$&-$,; Vilares et al., supra note $!. 
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the essence of the distinction between knowing and reckless mental states, as 
envisaged under the Model Penal Code, re,ects di)erent probabilities—such 
that (!) judging there to be a !""% likelihood that something will happen is 
“knowing” that it will; and (&) lesser likelihoods re,ect lessening degrees of 
“recklessness.” Nevertheless, one could always argue that manipulating 
certainty and uncertainty in the laboratory misses something essential about 
the Model Penal Code mental states. 
Sixth, context may matter. It is possible that the particular brain-based 
distinctions our team has identi%ed between knowing and reckless decisions, 
when deciding whether or not to carry contraband, may not generalize to all 
knowing and reckless decisions, when deciding whether or not to engage in 
other kinds of activities. 
Seventh, it seems appropriate to acknowledge that as researchers we can’t 
be certain what a subject actually “knew” in the scanner. We told subjects that 
one (and only one) case each trial would contain “valuable content.” And we 
also told them that each trial they would be presented with between one and 
%ve cases. Therefore, subjects shown only one case on a given trial could 
straightforwardly deduce that that case logically must contain the valuable 
content, because the probability that it would do so is !""%. When only one 
case was on o)er, subjects indeed behaved as if they knew. But we cannot 
claim that all subjects actually knew what they clearly should have known. 
CONCLUSION 
Pick any weekday, and you will %nd hundreds of felony trials underway 
in America. With rare exceptions, the question is whether the accused did 
something prohibited while in a culpable state of mind. In the supermajority 
of states that follow the Model Penal Code, there are four culpable states of 
mind: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. 
The law predicates di)erences in criminal liability on what the law 
supposes to be independently speci%able psychological di)erences that 
underlie and constitute di)erences in criminal culpability. But is this 
presupposition true? If there are such psychological di)erences, there must 
also be brain di)erences. Consequently, the moral legitimacy of the Model 
Penal Code’s taxonomy of culpable mental states—which punishes those in 
de%ned mental states di)erently—depends on whether those mental states 
actually correspond to di)erent brain states in the way the Model Penal Code 
categorization assumes. 
The experiment described here is the first to investigate whether one long-
standing assumption underlying the Model Penal Code’s approach to culpable 
mental states stands up to empirical scrutiny. More specifically, we and our 
colleagues coupled fMRI brain imaging techniques and a machine learning 
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algorithm (a form of artificial intelligence) to see if the brain activities during 
knowing and reckless states of mind can ever be reliably distinguished. 
The answer is Yes. So our experiment provides a concrete example of how 
neuroscientific methods can contribute information relevant to legal policy.  
First and foremost, however, our experiment demonstrates that it is possible to 
predict, with high accuracy, which mental state a subject is in using brain 
imaging data alone. The results therefore provide the first empirical support for 
the law to draw a line between, and to establish separate punishment amounts 
for, knowing and reckless criminality. This discovery could be the first step 
toward legally defined mental states that reflect actual and detectable 
psychological states, grounded in neural activity within the brain. 
Our results do not by themselves suggest that there should or shouldn’t 
be reform of the law of mens rea. We have provided evidence that knowing 
and reckless mental states are—at least in some contexts—di)erent in the 
brain. We believe that information is valuable if one cares about whether or 
not the Model Penal Code’s approach to culpable mental states can bear the 
weight that the law asks it to. But our %nding that the mental states can 
indeed re,ect di)erent brain activity does not mean the Model Penal Code 
distinction between knowing and reckless states should remain intact, any 
more than a contrary %nding would mean that the Model Penal Code 
distinction between knowing and reckless mental states should be abandoned. 
Support for policy change comes from the intersection of values, facts, and 
fundamental principles, and not from the facts alone. 
We should all be interested in evidence-based legal reforms. But such 
reforms require evidence on which they can be based. When it comes to the 
law of mens rea, the relevant source of such evidence is psychology, cognitive 
science and, thanks to increasingly sophisticated technology for measuring 
the brain, neuroscience. As we hope to have demonstrated here, when 
neuroscienti%c techniques are aimed directly at questions of legal relevance, 
they can provide exactly the kind of evidence that can aid, although not 
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